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1. The Chief Military Technical Committee (Glavni Voenno-Tekhnichiski Komitet) of the Soviet Army was headed by the Chief of the Army General Staff [redacted] 25X1  
[redacted] It was divided into sub-committees by types of weapons, i.e. artillery, tanks, air, engineering, and so forth. The actual working bodies were the technical committees, i.e. the subcommittees, of the various arms and services. The Artillery Technical Committee dealt with all weapons which were capable of being fired, including infantry weapons. 25X1
2. A plan for the design and development of a new weapon or equipment could at times be initiated by a "konstruktor" (inventor-engineer). If such an individual had concentrated on a particular weapon, such as a machine gun, he could work on the idea and then present it to the appropriate technical section.
3. Design, development, and production of new weapons was kept as secret as possible. If the weapons were new, they were kept secret until hostilities. Weapons which fell into this category immediately prior to World War II were, for example, the "Katiusha" (a rocket launcher), an antitank gun, an automatic rifle, and a machine pistol. However, if the weapon was already known to foreign armies, then it would be introduced generally in the Soviet Army. Mortars were so introduced in 1939.

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4. A technical committee, for example the one for the Engineers, had the following members:

- (a) chairman - the chief of the Army Engineers;
- (b) senior member - the chief of the engineering faculty of the Frunze Military Academy,
- (c) member - the chief of the Military Engineering Academy,
- (d) member(s) - chiefs of one or two faculties at the Engineering Academy,
- (e) temporary member(s) - a particularly well qualified engineer (usually an army officer).

Each technical committee, in addition to its members, had a permanent staff, with a permanent secretariat. The staff was charged with summarizing for and presenting to the committee all ideas which came in on the design and development of new weapons and equipment. Ideas could come from such sources as individual members of the army, construction bureaus (Konstruktorskii Bureaux - KB) under the appropriate arms and services, and construction bureaus located in factories which manufactured military items. Each branch of the army had its establishment in or near Moscow for the development of new weapons and equipment. For example, the Engineers had such an installation near Moscow - the Military Engineers Testing Grounds (Voenno Inzhinerni Ispitatelni Polygon). This establishment had laboratories and a construction bureau. The KB was made up of officer-engineers (in this case belonging to the Army Engineers) and it was charged with developing new weapons and equipment.

5. When a Technical Committee of a certain arm or service decided that an idea for a new weapon or piece of equipment was a good one, it gave a "taktiko-tekhnicheskoye zadanie" (tactical-technical assignment) to the KB of the arm or service. The assignment indicated the desired weight and size and what the weapon should be able to do and what it should not do. Also, if complaints were received about an existing weapon - a machine gun, for example - then a "zadanie" would be given to the KB and the manufacturer, indicating that certain characteristics should be corrected or that a new machine gun should be designed. Also a "zadanie" could go out to check into the feasibility of use by the Soviet Army of a weapon which had been developed by a foreign army.
6. Each Technical Committee had a list of factories capable of producing appropriate prototypes, i.e. factories having research and testing facilities. It also had a list of other plants able to engage in appropriate mass production.
7. After the prototype had been produced and if the specific Technical Committee approved it, the Committee recommended to the Chief of the Army General Staff that the item be introduced into the army and be mass produced. The General Staff decided upon the quantity it desired and which units should have the item and so recommended to the Council of Ministers. The latter body, along with GOSPLAN, approved or disapproved the recommendation. If approval was granted, the decision was then made as to how much should be produced and the time schedule for production. GOSPLAN had a section which knew how much material could be made available and over what period of time. In other words, this section knew which materials and how much of them were being used in all production during any year.
8. The Soviet Council of Ministers could at times exert a negative influence on military research and development, when occasionally a powerful figure (Stalin, for example) personally intervened. He did not understand the concept of a balanced force and favored tanks and artillery, not engineering equipment. The Council of Ministers was also not interested in such equipment as would be useful for the signal or transportation corps. For major combat equipment, however, the Council of Ministers tended to keep any eye on the rate of manufacture and would even help to speed it up if necessary. Generally, once a recommendation reached the Council of Ministers, it was approved, particularly if the necessary materials were available. In general, the Council of Ministers did not engage in research and development. It did not have a committee or staff division concerned with research and development of military weapons and equipment. However, at times

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individual members, such as Stalin, could and did take interest in the development of major weapons and would demand reports on the subject. Such interest, in fact, amounted to interference rather than help and served to disturb the balance of the armed forces in regard to weapons and equipment.

9. GOSPLAN did not engage in military research and development, did not have a committee for this purpose, and did not have any official connection in this regard with the Council of Ministers. GOSPLAN did assign goals to such Ministries as those of Ammunition and Machine Building, specifying which items should be produced and how many during the year. This, however, was done after the new weapons and/or equipment had been developed and approved. GOSPLAN had no authority over plans for research and development. The Ministry of Defense placed its requests for the weapons and equipment it needed before the Council of Ministers. The latter body passed on the request to GOSPLAN for the sole purpose of having GOSPLAN calculate the availability of materials and factories. Once GOSPLAN had fulfilled this function, the Council of Ministers decided upon the priorities for the use of materials for the manufacture of the military items in question.

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